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Mineral Lease Division Revisited—An Old Doctrine 
with New Applications 
Randall S. Davidson∗ 
Andrew D. Martin∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Louisiana, mineral leases have been considered a form of 
interest in real property from a very early date.1 As such, courts 
consistently held that the mineral lease was indivisible.2 
Additionally, under pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence, courts 
universally allowed lessees to assign all or part of their interest in a 
lease to another party.3 These transactions could, and often did, 
appear in the form of assignments of the working interest for 
discrete acreage portions comprising less than all of the originally 
leased premises.4  
The notion of indivisibility presented a problem, however, when 
lessees assigned only a part of their interest in a lease to another 
party. Since the obligations were not divided, the assignor faced the 
possibility of damages (or even lease cancellation) based on default 
under the lease by the partial assignee—and not through any fault of 
his own. For example, a partial assignee to ten acres of a 100-acre 
lease might fail to pay the delay rentals due under the lease without 
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 1. Thomas A. Harrell, A Mineral Lessee’s Obligation to Explore 
Unproductive Portions of the Leased Premises in Louisiana, 52 LA. L. REV. 387, 
388–89 (1991). 
 2. Id.; see also Murray v. Barnhart, 42 So. 489 (La. 1906). Since its effective 
date in 1975, the Mineral Code has carried forth this principle by providing that 
leases are, in general, indivisible. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 (2000). 
 3. For an early case which discusses partial lease assignment, see Smith v. 
Sun Oil, 165 La. 907 (1928).  
 4. At the outset, the authors wish to disclose that they have asserted lease 
division issues in pending litigation seeking cancellation of pre-Mineral Code 
leases in behalf of lessors under those leases. Nevertheless, the topic deserves 
serious discussion. Our “issue bias” is no greater than the views of other lawyers 
who routinely represent oil and gas companies or others who receive consulting or 
similar fees to assert the industry position on the lease division issue as expert 
witnesses. 
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notice to the original lessee. If the lease obligations were truly 
indivisible, then the assignor who retained 90 acres could face 
cancellation as to his portion of the lease as well.  
The concept and practice of lease division emerged from this 
basic problem. It has since evolved into a complex, and sometimes 
confusing, topic of mineral law in Louisiana. More particularly, the 
effect of a lease’s division on its express and implied obligations is 
not always clear. This Article’s goal is to trace the historical 
development of lease division, set out issues not entirely settled at 
present, and suggest possible solutions to these problems.  
When a lease, subject to division by assignment under 
appropriate lease covenants, is assigned in part, we believe the lease 
becomes divided, in practical effect, into two leases for purposes of 
lease maintenance. Lease language that protects the lessee of a 
divided lease from liability for the failures of his assignee should 
likewise prevent him from benefitting from the maintenance or 
exploration activities of that assignee. The benefits and burdens of 
the lease should simply apply separately. Further, because lease 
division is fundamentally a creature of contract, a lease can be 
divided in any manner specified by the language of the lease: 
vertically, horizontally, or even by substance.  
II. HISTORY: PRE-MINERAL CODE JURISPRUDENCE 
Arguably, the most important case in the history of lease 
division is Swope v. Holmes, decided by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in 1929.5 In Swope, the lessor sought partial cancellation of a 
2,500-acre mineral lease as to a 440-acre section.6 The rights to 
these 440 acres were transferred from the lessee through a series of 
assignments to the defendant.7 The defendant subleased some of this 
acreage but eventually permitted his sublessees to cease their 
operations.8 Though the lease acreage outside the 440-acre tract was 
productive, no production was obtained from the defendant’s 440-
acre tract.9 The lease in question contained the following provision:  
It is hereby agreed that in the event this lease shall be 
assigned as to part or as to parts of the above described 
lands, and the assignee or assignees of such part or parts 
shall fail or make default in the payment of the proportionate 
part of the rents due from him or them, such default shall not 
                                                                                                             
 5. Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929). 
 6. Id. at 131.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
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operate to defeat or affect this lease in so far as it covers a 
part or parts of said lands upon which said lessee or 
assignee thereof shall make due payment of said rental.10 
While the court did not expressly say that this language divided the 
lease upon assignment, the court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that production from other parts of the lease kept the entire lease in 
force.11 The court’s rationale was simple: the annual rental due 
under the lease was not paid as to the 440-acre tract in question.12 
The clause quoted above mutually exculpated the assignor, and any 
partial assignees, from the defaults of the others in non-payment of 
these rentals.13 In insulating each partial working interest owner of 
the lease from the rental defaults of the other, this provision allowed 
for partial termination of the lease; effectively, portions of the lease 
were cancelled when the required proportionate rentals were not 
paid for those parts of the lease.14  
Swope was followed two years later by Roberson v. Pioneer Gas 
Co.15 The lease in Roberson contained an essentially identical clause 
to the lease provision in Swope, which provided that, in the event 
that one partial holder of the lease defaulted in its rental payments, 
any other partial holder would not be faced with cancellation of his 
portion of the lease.16 The court in Roberson first decided that the 
transaction at issue qualified as an assignment, as opposed to a 
sublease.17 Had the transaction been a sublease, it would not have fit 
the express lease language providing for exculpation in the event 
that a part of the lease was “assigned.”18 Upon deciding this, the 
court stated: 
The effect of the assignment of the lease on the 40 acres of 
land . . . was to divide the original lease into two leases, by 
making a lease between the plaintiffs, as lessors . . . and 
Pipes & Mack, as their lessees, under the terms and 
conditions stipulated in the original lease. What Pipes & 
Mack did, or failed to do, to keep their lease in force on the 
40 acres of land, could not affect the lease which the Pioneer 
Gas Company retained on the remaining 85 acres of land.19  
                                                                                                             
 10. Id. at 132 (emphasis added). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 132. 
 14. Id.  
 15. Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931). 
 16. Id. at 47. 
 17. Id. at 48. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Roberson thus articulated the modern conceptual picture of a 
divided lease: the divided acreage portions should be thought of as 
separate leases containing the terms and conditions of the original 
lease. What keeps the lease in force on one divided tract will not 
maintain the lease for other divided tracts. 
The clauses in Swope and Roberson both dealt specifically with 
partial assignments of the lease.20 Louisiana is peculiar among states 
in its emphasis on the distinction between an assignment and a 
sublease in the mineral law context. Thorough explanations of the 
evolution of this dichotomy are available from many sources.21 In 
brief, the difference is that, in a sublease, the transferor retains 
something in the transferred interest; whereas, in an assignment, the 
transferor hands over the entirety of his interest.22 For example, in 
Smith v. Sun Oil Co.,23 a transfer of a lease interest was classified as 
a sublease, as the assignor retained an overriding royalty and right of 
reversion in the transaction.24 These particular retained interests are 
not the only ones that will render a particular transfer a “mere” 
sublease; rather, the lessee need only to retain some interest that 
runs for the life of the lease.25 Conversely, not all retained interests 
are significant enough to constitute a sublease when, on the facts, 
the court concludes an assignment was intended.26 
A consequence of this dichotomy in the lease division context 
was that leases that allowed for division in the event of an 
assignment were not adjudged to be divided when the transfer at 
issue was determined to be a sublease.27 Though this approach has 
been criticized as overly formalistic,28 it is clearly a part of the 
jurisprudence.  
However, a 1929 Louisiana Supreme Court case, Johnson v. 
Moody, raised the possibility of lease division by sublease, rather 
than assignment.29 In Johnson, that is exactly what happened: a 
transfer of a particular lease interest was classified as a sublease 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. at 47; Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131, 132 (La. 1929). 
 21. See e.g., Stevia M. Walther, Overrides, Assignments, and Subleases, in 8 
LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW TREATISE, (Patrick H. Martin ed. 2012). 
 22. LA. MIN. CODE art. 127 cmt. (2000). 
 23. Smith v. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. 379 (La. 1928). 
 24. Id. at 384. 
 25. LA. MIN. CODE art. 127 cmt. (2000). 
 26. See, e.g., Dore Energy Corp. v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 997 So. 2d 826, 
829 (La. App. Ct. 2008). 
 27. Sun Oil Co., 116 So. at 380.  
 28. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, 
OIL AND GAS LAW § 414 (LexisNexis, Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2012) 
(1959). 
 29. Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929). 
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rather than an assignment.30 Despite this, the court pointed out that 
the contract contained provisions “showing that the lease was not 
indivisible, and might be forfeited as to a part only of the land.”31 
The court held that the unproductive, undeveloped portions of the 
leased land could not be held by production from the subleased 
tract.32 The undeveloped property was held to be abandoned.33 
Though this decision did not explicitly declare that a sublease did 
divide the lease in question, it suggests that such a result is possible.  
Subsequent pre-Mineral Code cases tended to follow the basic 
theoretical guidelines set by Swope and Roberson, and some took on 
the more expansive view of Johnson. For instance, one 1952 case 
referred to the availability of many clauses which could operate to 
divide a lease: 
Practically every modern oil and gas lease has several 
provisions under which the lessee, at its option, may 
“divide” the lease; perhaps the oldest and most common is 
the provision that the lease may be assigned in whole or in 
part, and in the event of assignment as to a segregated 
portion of the land, default by one leasehold owner will not 
affect the rights of any other.34 
This body of case law established the basic proposition that a 
mineral lease could be rendered divisible by appropriate contractual 
language. The typical triggering language was a clause that provided 
for “mutual exculpation” for holders of the lessee’s interest in the 
event of a partial assignment, but other types of lease provisions 
were also held to allow for lease division. If the mineral in question 
was divided by lease provisions or assignment covenants—or 
both—that lease would then be considered as two (or more) separate 
leases to be maintained separately, even though each contained all of 
the terms and conditions of the original lease. This included 
extension of the term of the divided segments by operations or 
production. 
III. MINERAL CODE 
In 1974, the legislature enacted the Louisiana Mineral Code in 
Title 31 of the Revised Statutes, effective January 1, 1975. The 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 330. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952) (emphasis 
added). 
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Mineral Code carried forward the prior law allowing the lessee to 
subdivide or assign the lease in whole or in part, codifying this rule 
in Mineral Code article 127. The Code then expressly addresses the 
issue of lease division in article 130, which states plainly: “[a] 
partial assignment or partial sublease does not divide a mineral 
lease.”35 Unlike the prior case law, the article makes clear that a 
partial assignment does not, by itself, divide a mineral lease.36 
However, the Comment to article 130 recognizes the pre-Mineral 
Code jurisprudence allowing division when there is a lease clause 
providing for such, stating:  
There are several cases dealing with partial assignments of 
leases containing a clause permitting assignment in whole or in part 
and providing that in the case or a partial assignment failure of an 
assignee to make payment of his proportionate part of the rentals 
will not result in termination as to the remainder of the lease. . . . In 
all of these, the court has held that such a clause makes a lease 
divisible so that when there is a partial assignment, there are two 
leases with different sets of rights and obligations between lessor 
and lessee. Not only will this be true as to the rental obligation, it is 
true also of the effect of drilling or production on maintenance of the 
lease. The unarticulated premise of these cases is that in the absence 
of such provisions the lease would be indivisible in the sense that a 
partial assignment would not have the effect of creating two leases 
where but one existed before. It is therefore correct to say that 
[a]rticle 130 reflects established law insofar as assignments are 
concerned.37 
Thus, the default rule of article 130—that a mineral lease is not 
divided by assignment—is open to alteration by the parties to a 
lease.38 Such modification is permissible under Mineral Code article 
3, which states, “[u]nless expressly or impliedly prohibited from 
doing so, individuals may renounce or modify what is established in 
their favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or 
modification does not affect the rights of others and is not contrary 
to the public good.”39 The explicit recognition in the Comment to 
article 130 of pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence (specifically, those 
cases concerning leases containing language of divisibility) makes it 
clear that such language is not contrary to the public good, and 
                                                                                                             
 35. LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 (2000). 
 36. Id. 
 37. LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 cmt. (2000). 
 38. Id. 
 39. LA. MIN. CODE art. 3 (2000). 
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leasing parties are not, therefore, expressly or impliedly prohibited 
from using language modifying the rule of article 130.40  
The Comment to Mineral Code article 130 also asserted that 
article 130 sustained pre-Code jurisprudence limiting lease division 
under the standard divisibility language to assignments, rather than 
subleases. The Comment to article 130 states: “[a]s to the effect of a 
partial sublease, it is, again, consonant with the theory concerning 
the nature of the sublease to conclude that a partial sublease has no 
divisive effect.”41 However (with due respect to authors of the 
Comment), that statement is not categorically true. Consistent with 
the principle of Mineral Code article 3, parties are free to add 
language to their lease allowing for a sublease that divides the rights 
and obligations of the sublessor and sublessee.42 Such a division was 
at least impliedly deemed possible in Johnson v. Moody,43 and 
nothing in the language of article 130 evidences a desire to overrule 
this result. 
The present Civil Code articles regarding the divisibility of 
obligations support the important pre-Mineral Code lease division 
decisions.44 By stipulating that the lessee and his transferee are not 
liable for each other’s defaults, the assignability clauses in these 
cases contracted out of the Civil Code’s suppletive rules on 
solidarity.45 Civil Code article 1818 states that “[a]n indivisible 
obligation with more than one obligor or obligee is subject to the 
rules governing solidary obligations.”46 Expanding on this notion, 
Civil Code article 1819 declares: “[a]n indivisible obligation may 
not be divided among the successors of the obligor or of the obligee, 
who are thus subject to the rules governing solidary obligors or 
solidary obligees.”47 
The assignability provisions, which relieve the transferor or 
transferee of a lease interest for the fault of the other on the assigned 
portion, clearly cut off solidarity.48 As such, the obligations of the 
lease are rendered divisible. Allowing for the insulation of the 
transferor and transferee for the default of the other by way of the 
                                                                                                             
 40. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 cmt. 
 41. LA. MIN. CODE art. 130. 
 42. LA. MIN. CODE art. 3.  
 43. Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929). 
 44. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1818, 1819 (2013). 
 45. See, e.g., Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929); Roberson v. Pioneer 
Gas Co. 137 So. 46 (La. 1931). 
 46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1818. 
 47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1819 (emphasis added). 
 48. See id.; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1818. If the lease obligations remained 
solidary, then there obviously would be no division; that is, each party would 
remain liable for the defaults of the others.  
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assignability clause, but permitting the performance of the lease 
covenants by one to count for the other, would result in a curious 
asymmetrical result clearly not contemplated by the Mineral Code 
or Civil Code.  
In sum, the Mineral Code settled many of the existing questions 
regarding what was required to divide a lease. The law in effect for 
leases executed after 1975 is that a mineral lease is—in the absence of 
special contractual covenants regarding divisibility—indivisible.49 
However, as mentioned above in the discussion concerning Mineral 
Code article 130, the parties to the lease can alter this rule by 
including specific language authorizing division. Whether (and to 
what extent) a lease is divided is dependent on the language of the 
lease.50 When a lease is divided, the lessee’s obligations applicable to 
the lease should inure to each tract separately; a partial assignor or 
assignee’s failure to meet these obligations will not endanger the lease 
rights of the other parties. However, the assignor and assignee should 
not be allowed to rely on performance by one to hold the lease 
interest of the other.  
Though the conclusions we draw above rest upon established 
principles of Louisiana law, a contrary view construes lease division 
in a much narrower sense.51 This position emphasizes that every 
lease clause should be read against the background of the default 
rule of indivisibility in Mineral Code article 130; to get around this 
rule, the argument goes, contracting parties must expressly provide 
the extent to which a particular lease is divisible.52 This position 
argues courts should not infer a total division of lease rights and 
obligations from lease clauses that only speak to limited 
circumstances.  
That Swope, Roberson, and their progeny are pre-Mineral Code 
decisions is all the more reason, under this view, to resist broad 
interpretations of exculpation clauses that arguably go well beyond 
the intent of the contracting parties. Proponents of this position 
would argue that, with article 130, the legislature provided a firm 
rule for indivisibility that can only be deviated from when parties 
explicitly repudiate it.  
We agree that lease division is a function of the lease itself. In 
the absence of a lease clause providing for a division of lease rights 
and obligations upon assignment or sublease, article 130’s rule of 
indivisibility holds. However, the jurisprudence clearly indicates 
                                                                                                             
 49. LA. MIN. CODE art. 130 cmt. (2000).  
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. (noting that Mineral Code art. 130 is “based on the concept that the 
lease is indivisible unless otherwise provided by contract.”).  
 52. Id. 
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that certain common lease clauses do imply a total division upon 
assignment, such as the Swope and Roberson lease provisions, 
quoted above.53 The courts in those cases wisely recognized that 
limiting lease division to merely one area yields an array of 
inconsistent consequences and uncertain relations between the 
relevant parties.54 Again, one must consider that allowing the lessees 
to be exculpated from defaults with respect to the interests owned by 
the assignee (or retained by the assignor) should also result in 
separate lease maintenance obligations to the lessor. The premise is 
simple but rests on sound principles of equity. A recent Second 
Circuit opinion supports this understanding.55 In Hoover Tree Farm, 
L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., the Second Circuit noted that the 
Roberson court, in its interpretation of the rental payments clause:  
[R]uled that a lease containing such provision would be 
divided for all purposes into two leases upon the transfer of 
the entirety of the leasehold rights to a specific geographical 
portion. Such broad interpretation therefore moved the 
clause beyond merely the subject of rental payment default 
to effect a stringent modification of the typical habendum 
clause principle for maintenance of the entire lease beyond 
the primary term by the operations and production of one 
well.56  
Similar clauses providing for such divisibility are widely employed 
in mineral leases today, and their basic effect is almost unquestioned 
by modern courts. There are a variety of open questions, however, 
relating to lease division that still demand judicial resolution.  
IV. UNANSWERED LEASE DIVISION ISSUES 
A. Horizontal Lease Division 
One question still undecided is that of horizontal lease division. 
In all the cases mentioned above, the leases were divided along a 
vertical plane; to state it differently, assignor and assignee were in 
each case responsible for the lease obligations under discrete surface 
acreage. In contrast, the assignor and partial assignee of a lease 
                                                                                                             
 53. Other decisions which recognize total division include: Noel Estate, Inc. 
v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Bond v. Midstates Oil Corp., 53 So. 2d 149 
(La. 1951); Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336 (La. 1940); Odom v. Union 
Producing Co., 129 So. 2d 530 (La. Ct. App. 1961), aff'd, 141 So. 2d 649 (1961). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Hoover Tree Farm, L.L.C. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., 63 So. 3d 159 (La. 
Ct. App. 2011). 
 56. Id. at 174 (emphasis added). 
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divided along a horizontal axis would own lease interests as to 
discrete subsurface acreage. Such division ostensibly occurs when a 
lessee makes an assignment of only certain depths covered by the 
lease; for example, “all those depths below 5,000 feet”; or, “down to 
the base of Formation X.”  
These sorts of depth-limited partial assignments are quite 
common and are motivated by similar considerations as instances of 
vertical division. A particular lessee-assignor may be faced with 
certain limitations, either technological or financial, which make it 
unable to exploit the deeper intervals of the lease. In such a 
situation, a partial assignment of the lease (which would yield the 
deeper zones to a more sophisticated, well-financed operator) might 
make sense. Similarly, the lessee-assignor may believe the shallower 
depths of the lease are “played-out” and may consider receiving 
some money from an ambitious operator, who is willing to further 
develop the shallow zones, preferable to simply abandoning these 
intervals and getting nothing for them. Finally, a lessee-assignor 
may make an assignment of only a subsurface interval covering 
specific target formations; for example, an assignment of the 
Haynesville Shale Formation. Again, different opinions regarding 
the continued feasibility of a particular zone or horizon, including 
the economic and technological limitations of exploiting certain 
plays already mentioned, might motivate an assignment covering 
only a defined subsurface interval.  
A threshold question is whether an assignment of only certain 
depths underlying a lease even represents an “assignment” which 
could result in division at all, or is merely a sublease. Though we 
argue a sublease can divide a lease in situations where specific lease 
language allows such a division,57 the more common assignability 
clause only contemplates division for an actual assignment. If an 
“assignment” of only specific subsurface depths is always found to 
be a sublease, then, as a practical matter, the vast majority of leases 
are not divisible horizontally, which does not does not reflect the 
intent of many of these assignments and thus does not follow 
logically from the basic principles of lease division. The inquiry 
should focus on the division of obligations of the lessee and what 
rights the assignor retains; the issue should not be resolved simply 
by the assignor’s reservation of an overriding royalty or the 
retention of other depth intervals.58 However, the Second Circuit in 
                                                                                                             
 57. See supra Part II. 
 58. See id; Dore Energy Corp. v. Carter-Langham, Inc., 997 So. 2d 826, 829 
(La. Ct. App. 2008); Hoover Tree Farm, 63 So. 3d at 174. 
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Hoover Tree Farm seemed to assume (perhaps in dictum) that 
assignment of a specific depth interval would not divide a lease.59  
The argument that an “assignment” of certain depth intervals is 
more properly classified as a sublease that, in general, does not 
divide a lease is well articulated in Scurlock v. Getty Oil,60 a Third 
Circuit case from 1973. In that case, the court found that a particular 
partial transfer of interests in two mineral leases—a transfer that 
covered only the lease rights in a particular unit and only as to a 
particular formation—was a sublease, rather than an assignment.61 
The court made this determination partly on account of the fact that 
the assignor retained some rights as to the assigned property; 
namely, the rights to use the surface of the property, the right to drill 
through the assigned stratum, and the right to benefit from the 
payment of delay rentals by the assignee.62 The majority opinion 
went on to state that the leasing parties did not contemplate 
horizontal segregation of the lease by the lessee.63  
The opinion in Scurlock did not rule out the possibility of a 
horizontal division of the lease under different facts, stating that 
such a result was conceivable under some circumstances.64 The 
court did not specify, however, what would be required for 
horizontal division in this counterfactual. On appeal, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court reversed the outcome of the case, but it did not reach 
the question of horizontal division in doing so.65 Justice Barham’s 
concurrence, though, maintained that the majority opinion 
necessarily presupposed that the leases were divided: “[t]hus it is 
necessary to determine that there can be a horizontal segregation of 
a mineral lease. In my opinion it has been so determined. In my 
opinion it has been correctly determined.”66 
The dissent in the appellate panel’s Scurlock decision observed 
that the assignor in that case did not retain any rights under the lease 
                                                                                                             
 59. Hoover Tree Farm, 63 So. 3d at 175 n.18 (“The Transfer in this case, 
creating ownership in indivision to the Deep Rights, is not such a transfer of 
leasehold rights in a specific geographic portion of the Lease, like the two 
transfers at issue in Sun Oil and Roberson. As such, the Transfer did not implicate 
the provision of paragraph 10 of the Lease . . . concerning partial lease default and 
a possible lease division.”). It is crucial to note, however, that the transfer in this 
case was to 50% of the deep rights in the leased property, rather than all of the 
interest as to those depths.  
 60. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 278 So. 2d 851 (La. Ct. App. 1973), 
rev’d in part, 294 So. 2d 810 (La. 1974).  
 61. Id. at 854. 
 62. Id. at 857. 
 63. Id. at 858. 
 64. Id. at 856. 
 65. Scurlock Oil Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 294 So. 2d 810, 819 (La. 1974). 
 66. Id. at 821 (Barham, J., concurring). 
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as to the land conveyed.67 Just as a partial assignment of the lease as 
to discrete surface acreage does not entail that the assignor retains a 
right in the property assigned (in that case, the assignor necessarily 
retains only what was not included in the assignment), an 
assignment of certain depths under a lease assignment clause does 
not involve a retention of any rights as to those depths.68 
The majority’s argument, that both assignor and assignee would 
have rights to use the surface, is susceptible to this critique as well. 
The assignor, in that case, did not retain rights to the assigned 
depths—the rights to the surface were not kept out of the transfer, 
away from the assignee’s control, in the sense that an overriding 
royalty interest might be.69 Similarly unpersuasive is the argument 
that the ability to drill through the assigned stratum represents some 
retention of rights; rather, the right to drill through those depths 
springs not only out of the original lease, but also from the doctrine 
of correlative rights.70 
The claim that the initial parties to the lease did not intend it to 
be divisible by a horizontal segregation is more interesting but 
ultimately no more tenable. By the plain language of the typical 
assignability clauses, like those quoted above in previous sections of 
this Article, it appears that most leases simply are divisible by the 
partial assignment of certain depths. When the words of a contract 
are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further 
interpretation may be made in search of the parties’ intent.71 An 
assignment of the lease rights below 5,000 feet, for example, is an 
assignment of a “part or parts” of the lease. On the other hand, if the 
lease clause providing for division mentions only segregated surface 
portions of the property, then the lease may not be divided by depth.  
The effect of the non-payment of delay rentals by one of the 
parties is potentially problematic. If a party with rights as to the 
shallow depths fails to pay delay rentals, could the party with rights 
to the lower depths face forfeiture? Is the “burden on the lessee” 
increased if the holders of the shallow and the deep rights are each 
required to pay the full amount of delay rentals?72 In the most 
commonly encountered lease forms assignment clause, once the 
assignor signs away his lease interest as to a particular depth, he is 
not liable for the obligations allocable to that interval, nor is he 
                                                                                                             
 67. Scurlock, 278 So. 2d at 863. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 857–58. 
 70. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 11 (2000). 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2046 (2013). 
 72. See infra Part V.B. 
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required to pay any more than he would have before the 
assignment.73  
In sum, the rationale allowing for lease division by an 
assignment of segregated surface portions of the lease would 
logically apply equally to assignments of discrete subsurface depths. 
A typical partial transfer of the lease rights to certain depths or a 
certain formation—where the assignor retains nothing substantial in 
those depths—should be properly categorized as an “assignment” as 
that term is understood in Louisiana. Decisions from other 
jurisdictions endorse the concept of horizontal lease division.74 If 
and when the Louisiana Supreme Court considers the issue, it 
should be decided similarly. 
B. Division by Substance 
An even more uncertain area of lease divisibility is the 
possibility of a lease that is divided by substance type. Mineral 
lessees rarely assign out their lease rights to either oil or gas under 
the leased property. If such an assignment operated to divide the 
lease rights and obligations, the assignor and partial-assignees would 
be confronted with many of the lease division issues discussed in 
sections of this Article above. For instance, if an assignment of “all 
gas rights” under a given lease resulted in a division between those 
gas rights and the oil and other mineral rights under the lease, 
production of oil alone from the leased premises might not maintain 
the lease as to the gas rights, and vice versa. The lease might then 
terminate as to these rights, and the lessor would be free to re-lease 
the property for gas exploration.75 
This issue is purely speculative at the moment. We know of no 
reported Louisiana case where the divisibility by mineral substance 
was at issue. The division by substance in an assignment is rare and 
will likely continue to be rare. As has been stated several times in 
this Article, lease divisibility in Louisiana is dependent on language 
                                                                                                             
 73. The M.L. Bath LA. Special 540-R1 form states: “[t]he rights of either 
party hereunder may be assigned in whole or in part, and the provisions hereof 
shall extend to the heirs, successors, assigns and sublessees of the parties hereto, 
but no change or division in ownership of the land, rentals or royalties however 
accomplished shall operate to enlarge the obligations or diminish the rights of 
Lessee.” 
 74. See also John H. Tucker, Jr., Sub-lease and Assignment, Some of the 
Problems Resulting from the Distinction, LA. STATE UNIV. THIRD ANNUAL INST. 
ON MINERAL LAW 196 (1955); W.R. Niblack, Some Consequences of Horizontal 
Division of Oil and Gas Leaseholds, 8 ANNUAL ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 1 
(1963). 
 75. See LA. MIN. CODE arts. 115, 133 (2000). 
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in the lease authorizing division. Thus, the lease is only divisible to 
the extent provided for by lease; that is, a lease is divisible only 
where the lease’s language allows, and by no more. If the lease 
providing for division references the assignment of a “segregated 
portion,” (or words of similar meaning of the leased premises) as 
many lease forms do, the possibility of a division of the lease by 
mineral type would arguably be foreclosed. Though oil and gas are, 
in reality, sometimes found in different horizons, the “segregation” 
in an assignment of gas rights does not necessarily happen along a 
physical plane. A clause allowing for division by substance would 
have to be sufficiently clear that the lease is to be divided by 
assignment of specific minerals.  
Another issue that might present further practical limitation on 
the possibility of a division by substance type is the assignment-
sublease dichotomy discussed above. A partial assignee of a lease 
limited to a particular substance might argue that an “assignment” of 
a type of mineral represents a sublease, as the assignor is retaining 
the remaining minerals in the transaction. Though an obvious 
response would be that the assignor is giving over all rights he holds 
in that mineral, the point remains that the assignor is retaining rights 
in the same lease acreage. 
Though there do not appear to be any mineral lease cases on 
point, an analogue to the pre-Mineral Code lease division 
framework may exist in the context of a mineral servitude. In 
Continental Group v. Allison,76 the Louisiana Supreme Court 
decided that, under pre-Mineral Code law, a mineral servitude could 
prescribe as to only one of the minerals it covered, in the absence of 
production of that mineral.77 Under the facts of Allison, the servitude 
holders never mined the servitude for lignite, and the Louisiana 
Supreme Court ultimately held that their right to explore for that 
mineral had prescribed for ten years non-use.78 This result would not 
occur today for servitudes created after adoption of the Mineral 
Code; article 40 provides that an interruption of prescription applies 
to all types of minerals covered by “the act creating the servitude.”79 
No comparable provision in the Mineral Code covers mineral leases.  
Additionally, the case law is extensive in holding a lease is 
fundamentally a creature of contract between the lessor and lessee 
and thus is subject to a different set of rules than those governing 
                                                                                                             
 76. Continental Grp., Inc. v. Allison, 404 So. 2d 428 (La. 1981). 
 77. Id. at 436. 
 78. Id. at 438. 
 79. LA. MIN. CODE art. 40 (2000). 
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servitudes.80 However, one may logically envision a similar result in 
a suit for a breach of lease obligations under a divided-by-substance 
lease, such as the result given in Allison: a cancellation of the lease 
limited to the assigned and undeveloped mineral substance.81 This 
outcome would allow a party that holds the producing oil rights to a 
certain lease to be shielded from any breach by the holder of the 
rights to produce gas. It would also permit a lessor to free up a 
portion of his mineral rights if one of the substances was not being 
adequately exploited after an assignment of that mineral.  
In any case, discussion of the effects of a breach of a lease 
covenant in a divided-by-substance lease necessarily remains merely 
academic until an intrepid lawyer advances a case involving a lease 
with divided substances. Such a case would need sufficiently broad 
language in the lease assignability clause to reasonably implicate a 
specific mineral substance.82 Even then, it might be argued that such 
a division by substance was a sublease, and thus, the drafting parties 
did not contemplate separate lease maintenance by mineral. Despite 
this, there appear to be some compelling reasons for recognizing 
such a division. For example, a lessor should be able to avoid having 
his lease rights to a certain substance maintained by production of 
other substances by other parties, effectively removing some 
minerals from commerce indefinitely. If a lessee holding rights to 
only one mineral or minerals could avoid negative consequences 
flowing from a failure of the other lessee party to develop the 
assigned minerals, then it follows that the lease should be considered 
legally divided by substance. 
V. LEASE DIVISION AND EXPRESS LEASE COVENANTS 
A. Habendum Clause 
No great controversy exists as to the effect of lease division on 
the most important of the express lease covenants: the habendum 
clause. An assignor and a partial assignee of a divided lease must 
separately secure production from the leased tract for which they are 
                                                                                                             
 80. See Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (La. 1999) (stating 
that mineral leases are construed as leases generally and that the provisions of the 
Civil Code applicable to ordinary leases, when pertinent, are applied to mineral 
leases). On the other hand, mineral servitudes are more tightly regulated. See LA. 
MIN. CODE art. 21−79 (2000). 
 81. Allison, 404 So. 2d at 438. 
 82. For instance, language stating: “in the event of an assignment of the lease 
as to any interest therein, the lease rights and obligations shall be apportioned 
among the several leasehold owners and default by one shall not affect the rights 
of the others,” might be sufficiently broad enough.  
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responsible or pay the appropriate rentals directly to the lessor if 
delay rentals are due.83 The failure of the one does not result in 
forfeiture of the lease by the other, and production from one does 
not maintain the lease as to the other.84 This is the most common 
situation in which lease division is considered today.  
Lease division thus operates to contravene the general rule that 
production from one part of the lease, even a non-contiguous tract, 
will maintain the entirety of the lease. This principle is codified in 
Mineral Code article 114.85 By dividing the obligation to maintain a 
lease after its primary term by production, lease division actually 
goes a step further than the similar effect provided by a Pugh 
clause.86 In a divided lease, even production from a contiguous 
divided tract will not maintain another segregated tract if the tracts 
have been assigned to separate lessees.87  
The effect is that a lessor has a relatively straightforward means 
of proving a failure of one lessee to live up to the lease conditions; 
rather than asserting a failure to develop as to a given portion of the 
lease under implied lease covenants—a more significant burden, as 
discussed below—the lessor is able to simply provide the production 
reports for each assigned tract. If no production is attributable to a 
specific assigned and divided tract, the lessor will be able to prove 
automatic termination of the lease under the habendum clause, 
rather than engaging in a lengthy battle under the implied covenant 
to develop.88 Again, if assignors or partial assignees of the lessee’s 
interest benefit (in that they are shielded from the failure to develop 
                                                                                                             
 83. See, e.g., Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); Bond v. 
Midstates Oil Corp., 53 So. 2d 149 (La. 1951); Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336 
(La. 1940); Johnson v. Moody, 123 So. 330 (La. 1929); Swope v. Holmes, 124 So. 
131 (La. 1929); Odom v. Union Producing Co., 129 So. 2d 530 (La. App. Ct. 2d 
1961), aff'd, 141 So. 2d 649 (La. 1961). 
 84. Id.  
 85. LA. MIN. CODE art. 114 (2000), which states in part: “[a] single lease may 
be created on two or more noncontiguous tracts of land, and operations on the land 
burdened by the lease or land unitized therewith sufficient to maintain the lease 
according to its terms will continue it in force as to the entirety of the land 
burdened.” 
 86. A Pugh clause is a lease provision that operates to divide the lease based 
upon the lessee’s development activity on the lease. Under the typical Pugh clause, 
off-tract unit production will only maintain that portion of the leased acreage 
included within the unit boundaries. A vertical Pugh clause applies the same 
principle to the development of the lease by depth intervals and would operate to 
release depths below those intervals in production at the expiration of the primary 
term of the lease or any extension of the term. See 4 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS § 
54:9 (Nancy Saint-Paul ed., 3d ed.) (Westlaw 2012). 
 87. See, e.g., Roberson v. Pioneer Gas Co., 137 So. 46 (La. 1931); Swope v. 
Holmes, 124 So. 131 (La. 1929). 
 88. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 133 (2000). 
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other tracts), then separate lease maintenance obligations should 
follow. There have not, as yet, been any Louisiana cases holding 
that this automatic termination applies in the horizontal division 
context. However, if one assumes that such division is possible, it 
follows that production from one divided formation or depth interval 
will not operate to maintain another formation or interval owned by 
another lessee. Any other result would yield a significant logical 
inconsistency in the existing theoretical framework of lease division 
in the case law.89  
B. Delay Rentals  
The “mutual exculpation” clauses that gave rise to the concept 
of lease division in the first place specifically related to delay 
rentals. These clauses were concerned with the effect on the entire 
lease of a failure to pay such rentals by a party who was a mere 
partial assignee. As a result of Swope and its progeny, the issue is 
firmly settled for the classic example of the divided lease: if a lease 
containing a mutual exculpation clause is assigned as to discrete 
surface acreage, the failure of the assignee to pay the delay rentals 
will not result in any forfeiture of the lease for the assignor and vice 
versa.90 These rentals are payable in an amount proportional to the 
acreage held by each party.91  
As highlighted above, the question with regard to a horizontally-
divided lease is potentially more difficult. If a lease holds that delay 
rentals are $10 an acre and the lease is divided by depth—so that the 
assignor and assignee are still under the exact same surface 
acreage—how are the rentals to be split up, if at all? If we assume 
that both assignor and assignee owe $10 per acre, are we not 
increasing the burden under the lease? Such a result would be in 
contravention of the typical assignment clause, which states that an 
assignment will not enlarge the obligations on the lessee or 
assignee.92 
The problem may be an illusory one. The burden on the “lessee” 
is increased only if we view all partial assignors and partial 
assignees collectively as the lessee under the original lease. The 
partial assignor has no greater duty, after assignment, in our 
hypothetical—he still owes only $10 an acre, just as he would if he 
simply released those depths. The partial assignee has the same 
                                                                                                             
 89. See supra Part I. 
 90. See the discussion on Roberson, supra Part II. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Scurlock, supra note 60, at 819 (quoting an example of a typical 
assignment clause).  
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duty; his obligation has not been increased and is equal to what he 
would likely owe if he had independently leased only those depths. 
The delay rental obligation is typically tied only to the amount of 
surface acreage and is not dependent on the extent of the lessee’s 
subsurface rights. Though the lessor’s benefits are now greater, they 
are not so because of the increase of any particular burden on the 
party with whom he signed the lease. Rather, the partial assignee is 
essentially the lessee of a new lease though he is bound under the 
same terms and conditions as those contained in the original lease. It 
is no more burdensome for either party than if the lessor originally 
leased both the shallow and deep rights separately and demanded the 
same delay rentals from both lessees. 
Three practical considerations should operate to allay concerns 
about this issue in a horizontally divided lease. First, the amount due 
under most delay rental clauses is very small; a potential partial 
assignee will likely not be dissuaded from taking an assignment in 
the lease rights as to certain depths because of the possibility of 
paying the same amount of delay rentals as was due under the 
original lease. Second, most leases are now paid-up leases that do 
not contain any provision relating to ongoing delay rentals.93 In 
these leases, there is no rental obligation at all, so the problem does 
not even arise. Third, lease division issues most often arise after the 
expiration of the primary term of the lease at issue, and delay rentals 
are not being paid at that point.94  
VI. LEASE DIVISION AND THE IMPLIED COVENANTS 
Today, an important part of the lessee’s obligations arises under 
article 122 of the Mineral Code. This article codified prior 
jurisprudence and states, in part: “[a] mineral lessee is not under a 
fiduciary obligation to his lessor, but he is bound to perform the 
contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased 
as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself 
and his lessor.”95 Thus, the central issue in implied obligations cases 
remains whether the lessee has developed and operated the lease 
property as a reasonably prudent operator. The breadth of this 
standard has allowed courts to tailor remedies to the individual facts 
                                                                                                             
 93. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, 
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS at 685 (14th ed. 2009) (“A lease effective 
during the primary term without further payment of delay rentals, the aggregate of 
rentals for the entire primary term having been paid in advance.”). 
 94. See id. at 231 (“A sum of money payable to the lessor by the lessee for the 
privilege of deferring the commencement of drilling operations or the 
commencement of production during the primary term of the lease.”).  
 95. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 (2000). 
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in a range of cases. Courts have, for the most part, wisely rejected 
the application of mechanical tests in determining whether a 
particular lessee has lived up to the prudent operator standard.96  
Despite the statutory openness to individual details afforded by 
an expansive standard, the Comment to article 122 asserts a 
narrower scope of the duty of lessees to a group of four (possibly 
five) implied obligations found in the pre-Code jurisprudence: 
In Louisiana, the general obligation to act as a “good 
administrator” or “prudent operator” has been clearly 
specified in four situations: (1) the obligation to develop 
known mineral producing formations in the manner of a 
reasonable, prudent operator; (2) the obligation to explore 
and test all portions of the leased premises after discovery of 
minerals in paying quantities in the manner of a reasonable, 
prudent operator; (3) the obligation to protect the leased 
property against drainage by wells located on neighboring 
property in the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator; 
and (4) the obligation to produce and market minerals 
discovered and capable of production in paying quantities in 
the manner of a reasonable, prudent operator.97 
Additionally, the Comment mentions the possibility of including a 
fifth covenant duty to restore the surface of the leased premises after 
the cessation of operations as an implied obligation under article 
122.98 However, as will be explained below, this obligation should 
no longer be treated as an implied covenant in Louisiana; it is an 
express obligation under most lease forms, and the issue is governed 
by other statutes.99  
With due respect to these Comments, nothing in article 122 
purports to limit its scope to the four items mentioned in the 
Comments, and we would argue that the legislature, by its broader 
language, intended to provide for future developments in our 
mineral law to meet new challenges in the industry’s development 
and the interface between the lessor and lessee. 
A. Exploration and Development  
The covenants of exploration and development are closely 
related. The Comment to Mineral Code article 122, while itself 
listing the obligations separately and noting that Williams and 
                                                                                                             
 96. Harrell, supra note 1, at 406. 
 97. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt. (2000).  
 98. Id. 
 99. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2007). 
20 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 2 
 
 
 
Meyers makes the same distinction, states that the covenant of 
exploration is an “evolutionary offshoot” of the obligation to 
develop.100 The connection comes from the fact that both 
obligations are essentially about the use of the leased property; the 
lease encumbers the minerals under the entire premises, and 
therefore, the lessee must explore and then develop the minerals to 
the greatest extent practical under the circumstances. If he fails to do 
so, the lessor never obtains his main consideration for the contract—
the development and production of any minerals underneath the 
leased premises.101  
The connection between these obligations and lease division is 
perhaps obvious in light of the history of the lease division issue. 
Some of the earliest cases regarding lease division dealt with the 
failures of assignors or assignees of the lessee’s interest to develop 
their respective portions of the lease.102 The courts in those cases 
recognized the inequity of cancelling an entire lease because of the 
failure of one partial assignee to develop.103 The remedy of partial 
cancellation evolved as a response to the problem of a lease that was 
only partially developed.104 A court could target those portions of a 
lease that had not been adequately explored or developed and leave 
the lease untouched as to the remaining acreage. Article 142 of the 
Mineral Code explicitly carried this solution forward to the modern 
day.105 The practical effect seems to be that whether a lease has been 
divided among multiple parties (by assignment, sublease, or 
anything else) is irrelevant to a determination of whether a given 
portion is subject to a penalty, or perhaps cancellation, for a breach 
of the exploration or development covenant. According to Williams 
and Meyers:  
The availability of decrees of partial cancellation renders 
almost academic the problem of the effect on lease 
covenants of partial assignments. If a portion of the 
leasehold has been adequately explored or developed and 
another portion has not, most courts will cancel (at least 
                                                                                                             
 100. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt. (citing 5 WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, Oil and 
Gas Law, ch. 8 (1969)). 
 101. Carter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26, 28 (La. 1948). 
 102. See the discussion of Roberson and Swope, supra Part II. 
 103. Id.  
 104. See Eota Realty Co. v. Carter Oil Co., 74 So. 2d 30, 36 (La. 1954); Carter, 
36 So. 2d at 30; Harrell, supra note 1, at 393.  
 105. LA. MIN. CODE art. 142 (2000) (“A mineral lease may be dissolved 
partially or in its entirety. A decree of partial dissolution may be made applicable 
to a specified portion of land, to a particular stratum or strata, or to a particular 
mineral or minerals.”). 
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conditionally) the lease as to the neglected portion of the 
leasehold and preserve it as to the other.106 
However, the assignments or subleases that divided a mineral lease 
may have a great practical effect when it comes to resolving the 
following issues: (1) the relief a lessor can obtain; (2) the 
determination of the lessor’s most effective legal theory to clear title 
to his minerals; and (3) the standards by which a court will 
determine whether exploration or development has been adequate. 
For one, the boundaries created by assignments that have 
divided the lease provide obvious and convenient lines of 
demarcation for partial cancellation of such leases for failure to 
develop.107 In practice, these demarcations will be obvious because 
the different owners of lease interests behave in different ways. The 
aggressiveness of one operator on his divided tract or depth interval 
may influence a lessor’s decision to bring suit against another 
operator on a divided tract or depth interval who is not conducting 
operations. In this sense, the internal boundaries within a lease 
created by assignment can have significant practical importance.  
As mentioned above, a divided lease provides the frustrated 
lessor with an additional avenue for relief: automatic termination 
under the habendum clause.108 A determination that a lease was 
divided, therefore, has great import for the lessor in determining 
whether he can proceed under the rather settled issue of whether 
there was production from any acreage attributable to the divided 
portion of the lease.109 But what of the scenario where old, 
marginally productive wells are arguably satisfying held-by-
production status for habendum clause purposes for each divided 
section of the lease, but a lessor does not believe the total mineral 
resources of the lease are being adequately developed? The 
covenants of development and exploration appear straightforward 
enough on paper, but in practice, disputes over additional 
development covenants will require putting the lessee in default.110 
This may be deemed an admission by the lessor that the lease 
continues in effect, and an extensive and expensive evidentiary 
battle will likely ensue. A single lessor may not have sufficient 
resources to engage in such a battle, which may demand expert 
testimony on geophysical data, evidence of operations on 
neighboring property, and an analysis of expected costs and profits. 
                                                                                                             
 106. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS, OIL 
AND GAS LAW § 409.4 (LexisNexis, Matthew Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2012) (1959). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
 109. See Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953). 
 110. See LA. MIN. CODE art.136 (2000). 
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Additionally, Louisiana places the burden on the lessor to prove a 
failure to develop.111  
Adding to the lessor’s burden is the fact that the resolution to the 
following issue is not entirely clear: What must he, the lessor, prove 
has been inadequately developed—the lease as a whole or only a 
discrete portion of it? Though the difference may appear to be 
semantic, a court adopting the “lease as a whole” approach will 
likely view a demand for partial cancellation based on failure to 
develop less favorably if all other portions of the leased premises are 
adequately developed. The Williams and Meyers treatise discusses 
the issue in the following manner:  
[W]here there is a question of the degree of diligence 
exercised by the partial assignee, partial assignments may 
influence the finding or not of breach of covenant. Should 
the defendant-partial assignee’s diligence be considered only 
in light of what he has done on his premises, or should 
reasonable development and exploration be judged on a 
lease-wide basis? . . . We are inclined to think . . . the latter 
position is sounder. The original lease contemplated 
development and exploration on a lease-wide basis. Nothing 
in the ordinary lease suggests a different standard after 
partial assignments.”112 
This view is attractive to the lessee’s position in these disputes, as it 
offers a clean, simple, holistic approach to examining lease 
exploration and development. However, the view appears to be at 
odds not only with the rationale allowing for lease division in the 
first place, but also with further development covenants under 
Mineral Code article 122. That is, if a clause allowing for divisibility 
cuts off solidarity as to the lease obligations—so that the failure or 
fulfillment of an obligation on one divided tract is cut off from any 
other divided tract—it would seem to follow that the covenants to 
explore and develop should likewise be divided and applied 
separately. Here, the concept from Roberson is helpful: two new, 
different leases are created after division (these leases would cover 
two different leasehold interests but maintain the original lease 
terms).113 Though the terms of a hypothetical original mineral lease 
do contemplate development and exploration on a lease-wide basis, 
the division of the lease by assignment should result in these lease 
terms being separately applicable to the acreage of each divided 
                                                                                                             
 111. Frazier v. Justiss Mears Oil Co., 391 So. 2d 485, 486 (La. Ct. App. 1980); 
Harrell, supra note 1, at 397.  
 112. MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 106, at § 409.4. 
 113. See supra note 15. 
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tract. As such, it is more consistent to understand the lease 
conditions—express and implied—as imposed upon each partial 
owner of a lease interest as to, and only as to, the acreage in which 
he has rights. The legal result should be two independent leases.114 
Just as a partial owner of a lease interest should not be punished for 
the failure of another partial owner to explore for or produce 
minerals on that other tract, he should not receive the legal benefit 
from the overall development of the leased premises if he does not 
adequately develop his own tract.  
This issue has not been directly addressed in Louisiana. 
However, a 1932 case decided by the U.S. Fifth Circuit, Cosden Oil 
Co. v. Scarborough,115 provides a good analysis of the problem and 
recommends an approach that accords with the one offered in this 
Article:  
In short, while the lease is entire as to the vesting not only in 
the original lessee, but in all of his assigns, of a determinable 
fee in each as to the part of the land he owns, that 
determinable fee as to each owner stands or falls, is 
abandoned or ceases, according to his own acts, subjecting 
him to the obligation for damages not at all for what is being 
done or not done upon the tract in general, but only for what 
he does. Any other construction would lead to interminable 
confusion.116 
Though Cosden’s rationale has been employed in many other 
decisions,117 the approach suggested by Williams and Meyers is 
perhaps equally relied upon in case law.118  
Framing the scope of the development and exploration 
covenants after lease division is similarly problematic when the 
division in question occurred along a horizontal plane. Assuming 
that such division is possible, a question arises: do we judge the 
adequacy of development on the basis of what has been done on all 
depths, or do we examine each divided depth interval separately? 
Imagine a situation wherein a lessee, A, assigns the lease rights 
below 5,000 feet to lessee B. Both tracts are separately maintained 
                                                                                                             
 114. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336 (La. 1940). 
 115. Cosden Oil Co. v. Scarborough, 55 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1932). 
 116. Id. at 638. 
 117. E.g., Hull v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 119 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1941), rev’d 
on other grounds, Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hull, 314 U.S. 575 (1941); Standard 
Oil Co. v. Giller, 38 S.W.2d 766 (Ark. 1931); W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil 
Co., 19 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. 1929).  
 118. E.g., Heman v. Jefferson, 483 N.E.2d 537 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Kothe v. 
Jefferson, 440 N.E.2d 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), aff’d and remanded, 455 N.E.2d 73 
(Ill. 1983). 
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by production, but A’s exploration and development activity as to 
the shallow depths are far more extensive than B’s are as to the 
deeper zones. Under the approach urged by Williams and Meyers, a 
judge faced with determining the adequacy of lease exploration and 
development would properly examine the development of the 
original leased premises as a whole, rather than treating the upper 
depths and lower depths as separate leasehold interests with 
individual obligations inuring to each.119 Such an approach mirrors 
the asymmetry noted in Section III above, where a party is shielded 
from the failures of another holder of part of the lease but shares, to 
some extent, in the successes.  
This problem is not merely theoretical, as the covenants of 
exploration and development extend to each part of the lease, and 
partial cancellation of a lease is a recognized remedy for failure to 
develop a lease even when leases have not been divided. 120 A lessor 
should be able to point out the unexplored or undeveloped portions 
of a lease and pray for partial cancellation, regardless of who has the 
lease rights to that portion. However, under the contrary position, a 
judge looking at the development or exploration of a leased premise 
as a whole may frame the issue differently than in the case of a lease 
divided by assignment. Adopting the “no division of the lease 
obligation” position would seem to stack the deck against lessors. 
B. Protection Against Drainage 
The duty to protect the leased property against drainage from 
adjoining lands is well-established in Louisiana. Early on, courts 
determined that lessors could obtain cancellation if their lessees 
allowed wells on neighboring tracts to drain the minerals underneath 
the leased properties. In Breaux v. Pan American Petroleum 
Corp.,121 the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decided that 
lessors could also recover damages for the failure to protect against 
drainage.122  
There is no real change in the application of this duty in the most 
common divided lease scenario, where a lease is partially assigned 
into discrete surface tracts. If one or both of those tracts is being 
drained, the lessor can and should treat each tract as a separate 
leasehold and make demand on the lessee who has rights to the tract 
actually being drained. If both are being drained, either should be 
subject to cancellation or damages for his or her own failure to 
                                                                                                             
 119. See MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 106 at § 409.4. 
 120. See Sohio Petroleum Co. v. Miller, 112 So. 2d 695 (La. 1959). 
 121. Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 122. Id. at 415. 
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perform, though not for the failure of the other.123 If only one party 
can prevent the drainage, the other should not be held liable for a 
failure to do so. A partial assignee of a horizontally-divided lease 
should not be held liable for drainage occurring at a depth he could 
not protect—for instance, drainage of gas at 12,000 feet if he only 
has the lease rights down to 4,000 feet.  
A thornier matter is the issue of drainage from the other divided 
tracts. In this instance, a conceptual problem arises if the lessor has 
also assigned his interest, so that the lessor’s rights to Tract 1 belong 
to one party and Tract 2’s to another. Can the former demand the 
drilling of an offset well to prevent drainage by Tract 2? The 
Williams and Meyers treatise suggests the answer is no.124 The 
original lease did not contemplate protection against this “internal” 
drainage, and an assignment by the lessor could increase the duty on 
the lessee.125 However, Williams and Meyers notes that at least one 
author has felt this position to be entailed by the very concept of the 
divisibility of lease obligations.126 
The reality may be that the concept of lease division is not and 
cannot be a completely consistent doctrine. There are inevitable 
contradictions that prevent a totally consistent result across each 
issue. Such appears to be the case here. If all the obligations are 
divided and the divided tracts represent separate leaseholds, the 
covenant to protect against drainage should inure to each separate 
tract or depth interval. That is, there can be claims for internal 
drainage in a horizontally divided lease.  
Rather than ask what the “correct” answer is, perhaps courts 
should instead simply look for the most pragmatic solution. The fact 
that the original lease language did not contemplate “internal” 
drainage should not be determinative. Instead, the potential for a 
multiplication of the lessee’s duty with each assignment by the 
original lessee should be the focus. From a practical standpoint, the 
lessee has an alternative means of satisfying or avoiding a demand 
to prevent drainage other than drilling a set-off well: the lessee can 
request unitization.127 A unitization order will ordinarily require a 
finding that the well is draining the unit acreage, but not acreage 
outside the unit.128 In practice, the order will usually satisfy the 
                                                                                                             
 123. Contra MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 106, at § 409.3, which suggest 
that these parties are jointly and severally liable for the full amount of drainage. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (citing Hiram H. Lesar, Divisibility of Covenants in Oil and Gas 
Leases, 25 KY. L.J. 142, 162 (1937)). 
 127. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt. (2000); Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 
163 So. 2d 406 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
 128. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9 (2007). 
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drainage covenant, regardless of whether the unit order is accurate. 
In a scenario where the divided tracts are actually near enough that 
spacing regulations are at issue, unitization would almost certainly 
be granted. Thus, arguably, there is a duty to prevent so-called 
internal drainage in a divided lease. From a practical standpoint, 
however, such a duty will be confined to a very narrow set of 
circumstances, and such cases can be dealt with on their facts.  
C. Marketing 
The duty to exercise diligence in securing a market is made up 
of two components: (1) the duty to make diligent efforts to market 
any production; and (2) the duty to obtain the best price for that 
production.129 This covenant is generally applicable to gas rather 
than oil because of the relative ease of securing such a market for 
oil.130  
Based on the basic principles set forth already, the application of 
this duty to a divided lease is fairly straightforward: the obligation 
should be separately imposed on each segregated tract, so that each 
partial assignor or assignee is responsible for marketing only to the 
extent of his control of the leased premises. If A can only produce 
and market from Tract 1, he is not responsible for the failure of B to 
market from Tract 2. The rationale would hold with equal force for a 
lease divided by depth, strata, or substance. In the hypothetical 
scenario of a lease divided by depth, it seems obvious that a party 
with rights vested in only a certain depth interval should not face 
forfeiture of his lease interest simply because the holder of the 
another depth interval failed to properly market its production. The 
same rationale, of course, would apply to a lease divided by 
substance. 
D. Surface Restoration  
Louisiana law on surface restoration is in a period of rapid 
change, evolving in response to a number of statutory and public 
policy considerations.131 To state it briefly, only the following can 
be said safely: an implied covenant to restore the surface of the 
leased property to pre-lease conditions after the cessation of 
operations exists under Mineral Code article 122 (which sets forth 
the lessee’s duty to act as a reasonably prudent operator); however, 
                                                                                                             
 129. Frey v. Amoco Prod. Co., 603 So. 2d 166, 175 (La. 1992). 
 130. John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the 
New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 809–10 (1976). 
 131. A full account of this transformation is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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the exact scope of that obligation is unknown.132 Some restoration 
obligations seem obvious. For example, filling in pits and removing 
surface tanks and equipment are to be expected from a prudent 
operator—but the resolution of other issues is less clear. 
After the extensive damages award in the famous legacy case of 
Corbello v. Iowa Production,133 the legislature enacted Louisiana 
Revised Statutes section 30:2015.1 in 2003, establishing procedures 
for the remediation of usable groundwater.134 The legislature 
expanded the remediation procedures in 2006 with Act 312, which 
set forth processes to regulate the remediation of well sites; Act 312 
was later brought into the Revised Statutes as Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section 30:29.135 In 2005, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
held that, in Terrebonne v. Castex Energy, Inc.,136 Mineral Code 
article 122 did not impose an implied duty to restore or remediate 
the leased property to the pre-lease condition, absent proof that the 
lessee had exercised his rights unreasonably or excessively.137 Thus, 
it was thought the obligation to restore the surface was only due 
under an express lease provision. However, subsequently, in Marin 
v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,138 the Court stated:  
In our view, the duty to remediate oilfield containment exists 
under the prudent operator standard of the Mineral Code by 
virtue of our holding in Castex, and it certainly exists under 
the Civil Code. The holding in Castex merely recognized 
that in the absence of unreasonableness or excessiveness, the 
lessee has a duty to restore the surface minus normal wear 
and tear. Where the lessee has operated unreasonably or 
excessively . . . the lessee has additional obligations. . . . 139 
In 2013, the court went further in State v. Louisiana Land and 
Exploration140 and decided that a court could make a damage award 
for a remediation claim in excess of the amount required under 
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 30:29, even in the absence of an 
express lease provision providing for such excess damages.141  
                                                                                                             
 132. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122. 
 133. Corbello v. Iowa Prod., 850 So. 2d 686 (La. 2003). 
 134. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (2013). 
 135. La. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2013). 
 136. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789 (La. 
2005). 
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 138. Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 48 So. 3d 234 (La. 2010). 
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28 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 2 
 
 
 
The relevance of these recent decisions to lease division is not 
entirely clear. There have not yet been enough cases decided to 
determine the respective restoration obligations of partial assignors 
and assignees after a lease has been divided. A partial assignee of 
one tract should not be held liable for a remediation claim relating to 
a tract in which he never held rights. On the other hand, an assignor 
who divested himself of rights to a certain tract on which operations 
had been conducted prior to assignment probably will bear some 
responsibility for a later remediation claim relating to pre-
assignment operations on that tract, absent an express assumption of 
liability for remediation by the assignee. Such a result would be 
consistent with articles 128 and 129 of the Mineral Code and with 
prior decisions that have held that all parties in the chain of title for a 
particular piece of leased property can be joined as defendants.142 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The concept of lease division initially benefitted lessees who 
were assigned discrete acreage of leased property. With a divided 
lease, the failure of the partial assignee to make payments of delay 
rentals (or the commission of some other default under the lease) did 
not affect the rights of the lessee-assignor. More recently, the notion 
has been used by lessors frustrated by inactivity on an assigned 
portion of their leased premises—usually through the lessor’s 
assertion that the assigned portion of the lease had to be separately 
maintained. Obtaining a judgment that an assignment divided the 
lease may result in a determination that there was an automatic 
termination for failure to maintain the separate areas of a divided 
lease. This remedy is attractive because of its relative simplicity. If 
all divided tracts are, in fact, separately maintained, a lessor may 
move to a cause of action based on a “failure to develop”: an 
implied lease covenant under article 122 and a more onerous action 
to bring. In article 122 cases, not only is a great deal more evidence 
required to bring the action (and, therefore, more expense), but there 
also remain a great many unanswered questions about how exactly 
implied covenants are enforced and about what exactly the remedy 
is for a breach of an implied covenant.  
If the assignor and assignee of the lessee’s interest under a 
mineral lease receive the benefit of limiting their liability to the 
lessor to the portion of the lease they own, it logically and equitably 
follows that each post-assignment segment of the lease must be 
                                                                                                             
 142. But see Wagoner v. Chevron USA Inc., 55 So. 3d 12 (La. Ct. App. 2010) 
(holding that a landowner has no right of action over damage to his property 
sustained prior to his acquisition of the property). 
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treated as a separate lease for purpose of lease maintenance. Further, 
our law should treat an assignment of discrete depth intervals as a 
division of the lease with the same effect as a division by surface 
acreage. Division by substance, though rare, should be subject to the 
same rule. The basis for such a doctrine exists in our case law, and 
the courts should recognize and apply the doctrine liberally in cases 
where lease covenants and assignment provisions require the 
lessee’s interest to be treated as divided for purposes of performance 
of lease covenants post-assignment. The vast majority of lessors 
have no control over the partial assignment of their lease; the 
division of the lease is initiated by the lessee for the benefit of 
lessees. Some protection of the lessor’s interest therefore seems 
warranted and desirable for the public interest. 
  
